OPED: The Sense of an Ending – Afghan War Chapter
Published Sep 2017/ Global Affairs
Written a few weeks before the new Afghan Policy was rolled out
‘The road to Afghanistan peace does not lie in Kabul’ by Rahmatullah Nabil and Melissa Skorka (Reuters – 12 July 2017) considers the political side of the equation, to bring stability to the region. That part makes some sense given the fact that boots on the ground have failed to deliver results and a lack of consensus has taken a serious toll on Pak-US relations. It also fixates on Islamabad as the root cause of all their earthly woes and considers taking a tougher stand towards their ‘reluctant ally’ in the hopes of turning the tide in this protracted war. That part makes less sense.
The change in policy direction is predicated upon assumptions that Haqqani's still use Pakistan as their base of operations. Islamabad’s reputation of using proxies continues to dictate U.S based policy-makers actions despite the changing security paradigm and emergence of a new pecking order.
Mapping a Quicksand
Afghanistan has seen a surge of deadly attacks lately; some attributed to said proxies - others proven to be insider attacks – or as they term it - the ‘green on blue’ cases. Such trends reveal the deepening crisis and reinforce the need for a well mapped route to extricate their forces from this morass. The way out does not lie in isolating regional players, especially since Kabul and Islamabad are finally learning to play nice for the sake of their collective well being.
Dotting the I’s – India, Iran, ISIS in Afghanistan
With multiple stakeholders in the backdrop, determining the course of Afghan policy requires a more nuanced approach. The confrontational method spelled out in the article involves naming and shaming Pakistan by exposing its ‘duplicity’ and sanctioning Pakistani military and intelligence leaders who ‘allegedly’ support proxies. It echoes the sentiments of the Hudson Report released earlier this year co-authored by Pakistan’s former ambassador to the U.S, who seemed a little too keen on trying on some tough measures for size to get Pakistan to behave.
Hard evidence of complicity, if it existed would have made for an interesting bargaining chip. The ‘better hope there are no tapes’, line once used to psych out FBI director Comey must not be the model employed in this scenario. Preparing to roll out the ‘bad cop, bad cop’ routine to pave over 16 years of failed policies should also make room for some context.
Brainstorming sessions currently underway in the U.S have led to whispers of troop surges and withdrawals, along with offers of embedding Blackwater style mercenaries in Afghan ranks who will carry their colors. Men with no allegiance or moral compass who will probably be disavowed should things go sideways on one side and soldiers in trenches charged with safeguarding their territorial integrity and keeping ISIS / Al Qaeda at bay on the other. What can possibly go wrong? Fighting fire with fire looks great on paper where it belongs and has all the makings of a nice B-grade movie.
Ignoring the role competing interests (India, Iran etc) play in securing a slice of the Afghan pie and the strain it puts on the regional dynamics will naturally undercut any efforts made to recover lost ground. Allied forces need to keep the enemy guessing but concerned stakeholders expected to clean up afterwards should perhaps be on board with the broader vision. And they must ideally be in perfect sync in terms of objectives – much like the enemy they wish to eradicate.
Leading the Counter-terrorism brigade
To date, Washington and Islamabad remain on different wavelengths despite multiple operations in progress by Pakistani forces against insurgents of all colors. While the U.S is trying to redefine the parameters of an Afghan strategy, some might say Pakistan has already envisioned its place as a regional peacekeeper. It has spent the past year focusing on curbing cross border infiltration by building a wall along the Af-Pak border, and at the same time, it mounted a diplomatic offensive to mend fences with its Afghan brethren.
Reports that Islamabad is soft on terror, whether they are based on idle speculations regarding Haqqanis presence or visual proofs regarding a banned outfits’ emergence as a mainstream political party, constantly challenge Pakistan’s credibility. Removing these remnants of a bygone ideology will ease doubts about their sincerity and commitment.
When Rhetoric becomes Policy
While circular conversations regarding complicity and / or duplicity cannot distract them from pursuing the path to peace and stability in the region, it does impact the way this major non-NATO ally will engage with its closest / oldest partners. Sanctions, images of carrots paired with matching sets of sticks have been a running theme of 2017, to the determent of relations.
It is nice to be acknowledged by Ambassador Shannon and have him admit that ‘Pakistan’s success against terrorism is vital for America’ at the Pak embassy in Washington. But it would be nicer to have that faith mirrored in the congressional corridors of power entrusted with launching rescue efforts for their troops without setting fire to the neighborhood in the process. They should have been mindful of the dangers of turning rhetoric meant for domestic / Indian consumption to policy which could affect present day operations and future relations.
One U.S official came a visiting a few months ago who shifted his friendly tone the second he left Pakistani airspace. Now another is on his way. The U.S Secretary of State - RexTillerson who is headed to Pakistan reportedly favors dialogue and diplomacy over ‘fire and fury’. Whether he would be able to head off the hawks seemingly intent on keeping the cauldron bubbling for the next 16 years remains to be seen.
Written a few weeks before the new Afghan Policy was rolled out
‘The road to Afghanistan peace does not lie in Kabul’ by Rahmatullah Nabil and Melissa Skorka (Reuters – 12 July 2017) considers the political side of the equation, to bring stability to the region. That part makes some sense given the fact that boots on the ground have failed to deliver results and a lack of consensus has taken a serious toll on Pak-US relations. It also fixates on Islamabad as the root cause of all their earthly woes and considers taking a tougher stand towards their ‘reluctant ally’ in the hopes of turning the tide in this protracted war. That part makes less sense.
The change in policy direction is predicated upon assumptions that Haqqani's still use Pakistan as their base of operations. Islamabad’s reputation of using proxies continues to dictate U.S based policy-makers actions despite the changing security paradigm and emergence of a new pecking order.
Mapping a Quicksand
Afghanistan has seen a surge of deadly attacks lately; some attributed to said proxies - others proven to be insider attacks – or as they term it - the ‘green on blue’ cases. Such trends reveal the deepening crisis and reinforce the need for a well mapped route to extricate their forces from this morass. The way out does not lie in isolating regional players, especially since Kabul and Islamabad are finally learning to play nice for the sake of their collective well being.
Dotting the I’s – India, Iran, ISIS in Afghanistan
With multiple stakeholders in the backdrop, determining the course of Afghan policy requires a more nuanced approach. The confrontational method spelled out in the article involves naming and shaming Pakistan by exposing its ‘duplicity’ and sanctioning Pakistani military and intelligence leaders who ‘allegedly’ support proxies. It echoes the sentiments of the Hudson Report released earlier this year co-authored by Pakistan’s former ambassador to the U.S, who seemed a little too keen on trying on some tough measures for size to get Pakistan to behave.
Hard evidence of complicity, if it existed would have made for an interesting bargaining chip. The ‘better hope there are no tapes’, line once used to psych out FBI director Comey must not be the model employed in this scenario. Preparing to roll out the ‘bad cop, bad cop’ routine to pave over 16 years of failed policies should also make room for some context.
Brainstorming sessions currently underway in the U.S have led to whispers of troop surges and withdrawals, along with offers of embedding Blackwater style mercenaries in Afghan ranks who will carry their colors. Men with no allegiance or moral compass who will probably be disavowed should things go sideways on one side and soldiers in trenches charged with safeguarding their territorial integrity and keeping ISIS / Al Qaeda at bay on the other. What can possibly go wrong? Fighting fire with fire looks great on paper where it belongs and has all the makings of a nice B-grade movie.
Ignoring the role competing interests (India, Iran etc) play in securing a slice of the Afghan pie and the strain it puts on the regional dynamics will naturally undercut any efforts made to recover lost ground. Allied forces need to keep the enemy guessing but concerned stakeholders expected to clean up afterwards should perhaps be on board with the broader vision. And they must ideally be in perfect sync in terms of objectives – much like the enemy they wish to eradicate.
Leading the Counter-terrorism brigade
To date, Washington and Islamabad remain on different wavelengths despite multiple operations in progress by Pakistani forces against insurgents of all colors. While the U.S is trying to redefine the parameters of an Afghan strategy, some might say Pakistan has already envisioned its place as a regional peacekeeper. It has spent the past year focusing on curbing cross border infiltration by building a wall along the Af-Pak border, and at the same time, it mounted a diplomatic offensive to mend fences with its Afghan brethren.
Reports that Islamabad is soft on terror, whether they are based on idle speculations regarding Haqqanis presence or visual proofs regarding a banned outfits’ emergence as a mainstream political party, constantly challenge Pakistan’s credibility. Removing these remnants of a bygone ideology will ease doubts about their sincerity and commitment.
When Rhetoric becomes Policy
While circular conversations regarding complicity and / or duplicity cannot distract them from pursuing the path to peace and stability in the region, it does impact the way this major non-NATO ally will engage with its closest / oldest partners. Sanctions, images of carrots paired with matching sets of sticks have been a running theme of 2017, to the determent of relations.
It is nice to be acknowledged by Ambassador Shannon and have him admit that ‘Pakistan’s success against terrorism is vital for America’ at the Pak embassy in Washington. But it would be nicer to have that faith mirrored in the congressional corridors of power entrusted with launching rescue efforts for their troops without setting fire to the neighborhood in the process. They should have been mindful of the dangers of turning rhetoric meant for domestic / Indian consumption to policy which could affect present day operations and future relations.
One U.S official came a visiting a few months ago who shifted his friendly tone the second he left Pakistani airspace. Now another is on his way. The U.S Secretary of State - RexTillerson who is headed to Pakistan reportedly favors dialogue and diplomacy over ‘fire and fury’. Whether he would be able to head off the hawks seemingly intent on keeping the cauldron bubbling for the next 16 years remains to be seen.
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